With the signature of the Asuncion Treaty by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in July 1991, the four countries implemented an ambitious program to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on their reciprocal trade; a common policy toward third countries was implemented in 1995. As MERCOSUR deepened further, intra-zone trade increased its share in total trade. In most cases, increasing intra-zone trade meant an increasing participation of goods where MERCOSUR members did not have a RCA at the beginning of the integration process. Starting from Krugman (1980) monopolistic competitive model for international trade we derive an equation to explain regional patterns of imports. Making use of a recently detailed database on intra-MERCOSUR tariffs we estimate the effect of tariff preferences on the origin of imports of MERCOSUR members between 1991 and 2004. The results show tariff preferences affected imports patterns in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, and to a less extent also those of Brazil and Paraguay. For the first two countries the results appear to sustain the hypothesis MERCOSUR may have induced a trade diversion effect, from which Brazil would have been the most benefited member.
Introduction
There exist an extensive empirical literature on the effects of regional integration on the patterns of trade and specialisation of countries engaged in such processes. A widely used approach involves estimating a "gravity equation" with trade between members of a regional agreement being identified by a dummy variable. Then, the magnitude and statistical significance of the dummy variable is a measure of the importance of the agreement under analysis. Previous empirical applications for the case of MERCOSUR have found a statistically significant effect (i.e. Frankel, 1997 , and more recently Mayer and Zignago, 2004) .
The possibility of distinguishing among different forces explaining the increase in the intensity of intra-regional trade, such as geographical factors, trade complementary, etc., versus those related to the evolution of tariff preferences is highly restricted by the availability of suitable data. The aim of the present paper, using a theoretical framework based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980) is to analyse the role of tariff preferences under the MERCOSUR on the pattern of imports of its country members, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, between 1991 and 2004 . In our case we make use of a recently developed database of intra-MERCOSUR tariff rates which is available at a great level of detail (MERCOSUR Secretariat, 2005) .
The paper is composed of this introduction and four more sections. The second section presents a brief summary of the evolution of MERCOSUR's trade policy and trade patterns. In the first case we distinguish between the two phases of MERCOSUR, 1991 MERCOSUR, -1994 when the agreement responded to the characteristics of a free-trade zone, and 1995-2004 when the four members adopted also a common trade policy toward third countries. The third section deals with theoretical and methodological issues. Based on Krugman (1980) Since its conception, with the signature of the Treaty of Asunción (TA 2 ), the aim of the MERCOSUR was to set up a custom union. In the case of MERCOSUR, we can identify two phases. In a first phase, 1991-1994, the agreement responded to the characteristics of a free-trade zone, when each country retained the power to set its own trade policy with respect to non-members. The second phase started in 1995, when the four members adopted also a common trade policy toward third countries.
Period 1991-1994
The signature of the TA in 1991 constitutes the cornerstone which gave birth to the MERCOSUR. As just said, the main aim of the TA was to establish a common market including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The TA established the timetable for the increase of tariff preferences among MERCOSUR's members, specific timetables were agreed for those goods already covered by previous preferential agreements, in any case, at the moment of the MERCOSUR being launched in July 1991, the minimum tariff preference was 47%, with December 1994 as the deadline to achieve a 100% tariff preference. In order to attend the particular situation of some sectors, an exemption regime was agreed. Finally, a sector left aside from the MERCOSUR agreements was the automotive industry, sector that was regulated by bilateral agreements 3 .
Period 1995-2004

Intra-MERCOSUR trade
According to the original timetable agreed in 1991, from January 1995 all trade among MERCOSUR's members was supposed to be free of any trade barriers; however this was not the case. In 1994, a new timetable was agreed for a limited number of goods, this 3 regime was known as RAM 4 . The RAM constituted a reissue of the exemption lists that were in force between 1991 and 1994. The RAM allowed each member to select a number of goods to be temporarily exempted from the requisite of 0% intra-zone tariff. By the beginning of the current decade all imports reached by MERCOSUR agreements were subject to a 0% tariff. 5 Like during the period 1991-1994, the automotive industry was left aside, being still subject to bilateral agreements. In general, the main guidelines ruling the sector are: (i) free trade but subject to a requisite of minimum content of local/regional production; (ii) limits to the possibility of unbalanced trade flows (this requirement has became more flexible over time, and it should not be in force after 2006) 6 ; (iii) in some cases, when the requirement of local/regional production is not met or the minimum requirement is reduced, quota restrictions become applicable. Finally, another sector not reached by the MERCOSUR is the sugar industry 
Extra-MERCOSUR trade
In line with the objective of establishing a Common Market, in 1995 MERCOSUR members agreed on a common external policy through the implementation of a Common
External Tariff (CET) to be applied on imports originated outside the MERCOSUR.
The CET has a structure with 11 levels, with tariffs in the range 0%-20%. The general principle is that tariffs increases with the share of value added of the goods subject to the tariff. Others criteria have been also considered, such as the existence of local/regional production. In general, for those goods not included into the exemptions to the CET, the highest rates are applied to final consumption goods; in the other extreme we have intermediate goods, while semi-finished goods are subject to intermediate rates. were an accurate reflection of the comparative advantages of each of its members, especially if we take into account the high level of protections prevailing at that time.
The main picture emerging from the data is that the patterns of trade specialisation are coherently related with the patterns of the RCA index. It is in the last group, the one where none of the MERCOSUR members have a RCA, where we can observe an import specialization, while the group where the four countries have a RCA shows an export specialization, mainly to extra-MERCOSUR countries. An important effect of any preferential agreement is that it favours trade between members of the agreement relative to trade with non-members countries. Table 2 presents the structure of intra-MERCOSUR trade according to the typology emerging for the countries' RCA indices. A notable result is that the group where none of the members had a RCA explains an important share of intra-zone imports, Uruguay 43.4%, Paraguay 42.8%, Argentina 40.7% and Brazil 29.5%. In all cases this group is the most important.
With respect to intra-zone exports, goods included into the group for which none of the members had a RCA explain a large proportion in the cases of Argentina (32.5%) and 160,937,168 172,504,281 516,385,100 492,106,515 4,644,457 12,737,150 13,510,199 17,573,321 Source: own based on LAIA and CEPII. 
Theoretical and Methodological aspects
As barriers on international trade between members of a regional agreement are dismantled, we might expect changes in the structure of trade with other members of the agreement vis a vis the ROW. In this case, we can expect intra-regional trade having an increasing weight at the expense of trade with countries that are not benefited by a preferential treatment.
Considering that a country's trade performance depends on a wide set of influences, many of which are interdependent, it is not an easy task to try to model the effects of trade integration on the patterns of trade of countries involved in such
processes. In what follows, and based on Krugman (1980) monopolistic competition model of international trade, we derive an equation explaining, for a given country z, the ratio of imports of good i from any two countries j and h.
The theory of the preferential liberalization
The classical theory of preferential trade liberalisation is based on the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. The aim is trying to identify if the reallocation of resources, both in consumption and production, produced by the substitution of suppliers that a discriminatory trade liberalisation produces, increases or reduces the aggregate level of welfare. To be able to determine which of the two effects, trade diversion or trade creation, will prevail it becomes necessary to establish a typology of the protection regimes that will follow after a discriminatory trade liberalisation. With this aim in mind, two aspects need to be taken into account, the relative sizes of the importer and exporter countries, and the efficiency of production of the exporter country relative to that of the rest of the world. Table 1 summarises the different alternatives. The first regime is when the exporter country within the regional agreement (country B) is not large enough to satisfy the demand of the importer country (country A). In this case the exporter country (B) wins since it captures the tariff revenues lost by the importer country (A), while the zone as a whole receives a lower welfare. Country B benefits from the protection granted by country A, increasing its production. Country A benefits when it liberalises its trade with a country B whose producers are efficient enough, and the country is large enough to maintain its own low prices after the agreement takes place, in this case the demand from A is not large enough given the supply by country B. Under these conditions, country B is indifferent, while the zone as a whole receives a larger welfare. In all other cases country B always wins as well as the two countries together, the situation of country A is ambiguous, depending on the magnitudes of the trade creation and trade diversion effects.
The most frequent case is when the exporter country sells its production in A at the high domestic price prevailing in this country (because of the tariffs on imports from the ROW), while it supplies its own market with cheap imports from the ROW. In order to evaluate the welfare effects of any given agreement it is necessary to look at the markets where the members of the agreement show an import or export regional specialisation. The model developed below assumes product differentiation à la Dixit-Stiglitz. Under this framework it is necessary to adapt the concepts of trade diversion and trade creation as originally proposed by Viner (1950) for the case of homogeneous goods in a model with 3 countries and 2 goods. There are many potential cases to look at when trying to analyse the welfare effects of a discriminatory trade liberalisation. An important case is the 3x3 model by Meade (1955) and later extended by Vanek (1965) and Lipsey (1970) Let us assume a model with 3 countries (A, B and C), 3 goods (1, 2, and 3), where each country produces only one good: A produces good 1, B produces good 2, and C produces good 3. Countries A and B are the two members of the union, C plays the role of the ROW. The integration between countries A and B implies the elimination of tariffs on their reciprocal trade, this means that in the case of country A the domestic price of good 2 falls. The assumption that each good is produced only by one country ensures that there 15 Trade modification is defined as the change in trade with outside countries due to the elimination of tariffs on goods traded only within the union (see Ethier and Horn, 1984) .
12 is no trade diversion. Then, in the case of good 2 country A has a net welfare gain (the increases in the consumer surplus exceeds the loss of tariff revenues). The effect on the market of good 3 (which is only produced by the ROW) depends on if this good is substitute or complement of good 2. If goods produced inside and outside the union are substitutes, there is a reduction in the demand of good 3 in country A, this means a loss of tariff revenues as well as a reduction of the consumer surplus. On the other hand, if the two goods are complement, there is an increase in the demand of good 3 by country A, which raises the tariff collection and also increases the consumer surplus. In summary, the aggregate effect on country A's welfare depends on what happens in the markets of goods 2 and 3. Vousden (1990) analyses the effect of marginal tariff reductions, he derives the complementary and substitutability conditions among goods traded inside and outside the union such that a net welfare gain is secured after the union. The members of the union would more likely to benefit from it when: the closer substitutes are the goods traded within the union and the less is the substitutability between goods traded within the union and those imported from the ROW. From these conditions we have that a successful integration agreement requires the countries involved in it to be as similar as possible (they produce close substitutes) and as dissimilar as possible to the ROW (a low substitutability among the goods produced by the members of the union and those produced by the ROW). Panagariya (2000) points out that in the model with product differentiation à la Krugman (1980) , the effects of a preferential trade agreements can be considered as an special case of the Meade-Vanek-Lipsey model, where the terms of trade with the ROW are not fixed (as a consequence of the product differentiation). In this sense, the introduction of product differentiation recovers a traditional result from Mundell (1964) , which showed that when import demands for all goods show gross substitutability and initial tariffs are low, a discriminatory tariff reduction by one country increases the terms of trade of the country benefiting from the reduction with respect to both the country reducing the tariffs and the ROW, on the other hand, the terms of trade of the country reducing the tariffs might rise or fall with respect to countries outside the union.
As Venables (2003 and shows using a conventional trade model (HOS), the costs of trade diversion could be unevenly distributed across members of a regional integration agreement (RIA). In particular, in a RIA between developing countries (South), the poorest countries (or rather the least capital abundant, which is probably more relevant for the case of MERCOSUR) are the ones that bear the costs of trade diversion, which magnifies initial income disparities. MERCOSUR could be an example of South- Geography models, which show that for positive but not prohibitive trade costs, the larger region has a more than proportional share of the production of goods exhibiting IRS (i.e.
manufactures), being a net exporter of these goods and a net importer of goods produced under CRS (Venables 2003) . Then, a CU between countries of different sizes, may induce a further concentration of the production of manufactures in the larger partner, at least until some point, after which further integration will induce a more evenly distribution of IRS activities. However, in this case, the increase in the ratio of imports from within the block to imports from the ROW is not due to a change in the origin of imports, but by the substitution of local production with imports originated in other countries members of the agreement.
Preferences and trade flows
Zignago y Mayer (2004) defines a border effect measure estimating a model that explains the import ratio between the foreign and domestic markets. The micro-foundations of the estimable form employs the well know model of monopolistic competition applied to the international market (Krugman, 1980) . They used domestic sales to normalize import from foreign markets, this requires the same level of product aggregation for production and trade statistics, however, the latter are usually available to a much greater detail, with production statistics being usually available with a too high level of aggregation. In the present paper we apply this model to derive an estimable equation of regional imports relative to imports from the rest of the world. The objective is to estimate the effect of regional tariff preferences over the structure of foreign expenditure from different origins.
14 Let us assume a world economy with J countries. In each country j ( ) σ > is the elasticity of substitution. Utility maximisation subject to the consumer's budget constraint means:
where: From equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) we have that total imports, including the proportion that melts in transit, by country z of varieties produced by sector i in country j are equal to:
where j i N is the number of varieties produced by sector i in country j; Using (3.4) we have that for any country z and sector i, the ratio between imports from any two countries j and h is given by:
For any country j the value of production by sector i is equal to:
16 For a matter of simplicity we will obviate the use of the index n. 
With respect to transactions costs ( 
Τ is the import tariff imposed by country z on imports of goods produced by sector i in country j. Using (3.8) we have:
, and
Substituting equations (3.7) and (3.9) into equation (3.5), the ratio of imports by country z of goods produced by sector i in countries j and h is equal to:
1 (3.10)
Empirical specification
As pointed out in the Introduction, the aim of our research is to evaluate the role of tariff preferences under the MERCOSUR on the regional patterns of imports of its country members.
Based on the model of the former section, the ratio between imports by country z of goods produced by sector i from any two countries j and h is expressed as follows: rer: real exchange rates between country z and the other members of the regional agreement divided by the real exchange rate between country z and the ROW. The real exchange rate between z and the other members of the regional agreement is an import weighted average of the real exchange rates between z and each member of the regional agreement. The real exchange rate between country z and the ROW is measured by the real exchange rate between country z and the US dollar. T_Pref: tariff preference granted to other MERCOSUR countries measured as ( One way to test if the MERCOSUR affected the import patterns of its members, would be through the estimation of equation 4.1 for before and after MERCOSUR was signed, and test if the coefficient φ 2 is the same for both periods. To follow this approach would require data on both imports and tariff preferences before the MERCOSUR was launched. However, data availability prevents us following this strategy. Firstly, statistics on tariff preferences are not easily available for before the MERCOSUR. Considering the limited scope of the integration process during pre-MERCOSUR times, one alternative would be to assume that pre-MERCOSUR preferences were constant at their values immediately before the MERCOSUR started. A second, and more difficult, problem to overcome is that countries good classifications used before the implementation of the Harmonised System Classification (HS) at the beginning of the nineties do not allow us to homogenize statistics for before and after MERCOSUR, at least at the level of detail used here. Because of these restrictions, the results reported below must not be understood as measuring the change in the role of tariff preferences due to the MERCOSUR, but just the effect of tariff preferences since the launching of MERCOSUR.
An important element when evaluating any preferential trade agreement is the presence of trade diversion. Within the stylized theoretical framework of section three, where goods are differenced across sectors and countries, such that each variety is produced just by a single producer, there is no place for the presence of trade diversion, at least in the usual sense of the concept, that is the shift in domestic consumption from a low-cost source (the ROW) to a higher-cost source (a partner of the regional agreement).
However, since the empirical application is carried out with some level of aggregation (four digits of the HS), we might expect the existence of some kind of trade diversion effect since goods sharing some common characteristics, which we may assume are close substitutes, are grouped together. In order to account for the presence of trade diversion, the variable T_Pref is interacted with a set of group dummies, with the dummies being constructed taking into account the existence of trade complementarities between MERCOSUR members and the ROW. Using Balassa's RCA index, a country j is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of sector i if its RCA index for that sector is larger than one, on the other hand, if the RCA index for sector i is equal or lower than one the country is said to have a comparative disadvantage. case, and the estimated coefficients are negative and significant, we might understand this finding as evidence in favour of a trade diversion effect.
Econometric issues
A problem with the estimation of equation 4.1 x x x can be used as instruments. 20 As reported by Judson and Owen (1999) through the use of Monte Carlo simulations, the estimation bias is more severe in the case of the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable than for the other variables included in the RHS of the equation. Bun and Kiviet (2003) obtain similar results.
A potential problem with Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is that lagged levels might be poor instruments for first differences, causing large sample bias when time series are persistent and T is small (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . Under these circumstances, Blundell and Bond (1998) (Bond, 2002) .
As said before, the problem with the LSDV estimator is that it produces inconsistent results because of the correlation between the cross-section specific effects i η and the lags of the dependent variable, the bias approaches zero as T approaches infinity. Nickell (1981) analyses the case of a balanced AR(1) model when N approaches infinity, while Kiviet (1995) and Kiviet (1999) concentrate on the case when N is small. (Table 3) . 21 All estimations were carried out using Stata's routine xtabond2 (Roodman, 2005) . 
Results
In this section we present the results for alternative specifications of equation 4.1 for each of the four members of MEROSUR. We run two regressions, in column 1 all available lags were used as instruments, while in column 2 the first available lag was not included into the set of instruments. In all cases the real exchange rate and tariff preference variables are considered as predetermined. Tables 4 and 5 present the result using sample A.2.
22 Table 4 reports the results when the tariff preference variable is not interacted with the group dummies. As shown there in all cases the estimated coefficients have the expected sign, however, they are not statistically significant in the case of Brazil. This result means that in the cases of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, an increase in the tariff preference in sector i, measured by a reduction in (
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, induces to an increase in the value of imports from other MERCOSUR countries relative to imports from countries which do not benefit from a preferential treatment. Because the presence of lags of the dependent variable on the RHS of equation 4.1, the coefficient for the tariff preference variable measures the short run effect on the ratio between intra-MERCOSUR imports and imports from the ROW. From the results in Table 4 , this effect is more important in the case of Uruguay, with Paraguay at the other extreme. However, in this last case the coefficients are significant only at 10%, while for Argentina and Uruguay they are at 1%. As expected, in all cases the tests on the residuals reject the null of no first order serial correlation in first differences (AR (1)), while the null of no second order serial correlation in second differences (AR (2)) is not rejected in all cases. Finally, the Sargan
Test on whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous is not rejected in all cases; for Argentina this is true at 7.6% and 6.8% level of significance.
When the tariff preference variable is interacted with the dummy variables ( Table   5 ) we obtain that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant in all cases for Argentina and Uruguay, for Brazil the same applies to the interaction with dg 1 and dg 2 , 22 Results for samples A.1, M.1 and M.2 are reported in the Appendix.
whilst for Paraguay the coefficient is statistically significant in the case of the interaction with the dummy dg 2
23
. As in the previous case, the autocorrelation and Sargan tests give the expected results. With respect to the magnitude of the effects across sectors, we obtain that, as could be expected, this is larger in the case of sectors included into dg 2 , those corresponding to sectors where others MERCOSUR members have a RCA while the ROW does not, the exception is Uruguay where the coefficient for the interaction between T_Pref and dg 1 is the largest but pretty similar to the one for the interaction with dg 2 . If we look at the differences across countries no clear pattern arises, depending on the case we look at.
An important point to look at is the coefficient corresponding to the interaction with the dummy variable dg 3 . As explained before, this dummy corresponds to sectors for which the other three members of the MERCOSUR have a comparative disadvantage, while the ROW has a comparative advantage, such that a negative and significant coefficient may be understood as evidence pointing out to a trade diversion effect. As shown in Table 5 , this is indeed the case for Argentina and Uruguay; however the estimated coefficients are lower than those for the other two groups, especially for Uruguay.
As said above, the presence of lags of the dependent variable on the RHS of equation 4.1. means that the coefficient for T_Pref measures the short-run effect of a change in preferences granted under the MERCOSUR. Table 6 the other two countries no significant effect was found. 23 In the case of Paraguay we do not include sectors corresponding to the dummy group 1 since only two sectors falls into this category making unreliable estimating a single coefficient for just these two sectors.
22
The results just presented are in line with the argument suggested by Venables (2003 and and outlined above at the end of section 3. Notes: (a) using sample A.2 (see Table 3 ). (1): using all available lags as instruments. (2) Notes: (a) using sample A.2 (see Table 3 ). (1): using all available lags as instruments. (2) 
Summary and Conclusions
In July 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Asuncion Treaty giving birth to the MERCOSUR. Under the MERCOSUR, the four countries implemented an automatic, and relatively fast, reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers within the zone. In 1995 a common external tariff policy on imports from third countries was adopted. In both cases, intra-and extra-zone trade barriers, countries have still some degree of freedom to implement their own policies, however this is quite limited. The homogenization of tariff barriers has gone much further than that of non-tariff barriers.
As MERCOSUR deepened further, intra-zone trade increased its share in total trade 25 ; this behaviour acquires more relevance if we take into account that during the same period both total exports and imports increased substantially. In most cases, increasing intra-zone trade meant an increasing participation of goods where MERCOSUR members did not have a revealed comparative advantage at the beginning of the integration process. In the case of exports to the ROW, the share of these kinds of 25 There has been in most cases a reversion of this tendency since the late nineties.
26 good increased at a faster rate than intra-MERCOSUR exports. The opposite happened in the case of imports. When looking at the importance of these sectors across the four countries, there is not much difference in the case of imports from the ROW, while for intra-MERCOSUR imports the importance of these sectors is larger in the cases of Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay, than for Brazil.
In order to measure to what extent the reduction of intra-zone barriers under the MERCOSUR affected the import patterns of its members, in section 3 we derived an equation based on Krugman (1980) 
